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IN THE SUPREME C,QURT 
of the 
S(TATE OF UTAH 




REUBEN J. LEVINSON AND YETTA 
LEVINSON, 
Defendants. 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
NATURE OF THE CASE 
Case No. 
8793 
This is an action to compel release of escrow money 
under a contract for the sale of a house which was 
under construction. Plaintiffs brought suit as vendors 
in a written contract for the sale of real estate and 
demanded payment of $3,000.00 which had been with-
held from the purchase price pending satisfactory com-
pletion of certain work. Defendants denied that the rP-
quired work had been performed, and counterclaimed 
for damages resulting from inferior workmanship and 
defect.s in the house. The trial court, sitting witltou t a 
jury, denied defendants' counter claim and entered judg-
ment against them in the sum of $2,739.00. Frotn this 
judgment, the defendants appeal. 
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STATEMENT OF FACTS 
March of 1955 respondents began construction of a 
house on certain premises located at 4210 Holloway 
Drive in Salt Lake c·ounty (T-7, 36). It was thought that 
the house would be built for sale, but, if a purchaser 
were not available, respondents would move into the 
house ( T -6). On X ovember 7, 1955, when the house was 
nearly completed, respondents and appellants entered 
into a contract whereby respondents agreed to sell and 
appellants agreed to purchase the house (Exhibit 1). 
It was agreed, however, that the house "~as not yet com-
plete and of the $36,000.00 total purchase price, $3,000.00 
should be put in escrow and delivered to respondents 
only after satisfactory co1npletion of the remaining work 
(Exhibit 1). Certain items were specified as essential 
parts of the "~ork to be satisfactorily completed, and a list 
of these items, including a one year guarantee against 
~tructural defects, ,,~as attached to the contract as Exhibit 
~\ (l~xhibit 2). It "\Yas finall:~ agreed that respondents 
\Youlrl hr allo,ved a period of ninet:~ days to complete the 
rPntaining "~ork under the contract (Exhibit 1). 
l~~videner .adduced at the trial revealed that appel-
lant~ "·ere di~htrbed by a series of items 'Yhich reflected 
either dt'fretivr Inaterials or careless workluanship. It 
\r:t~ tP~tifit'd that re~pondents l1ad agreed to supply a 
(1rneral T~~h,etrje pull-out t~~pe disl1,,-asher and disposal 
u11it. ( I~~xhihit ~).but "-hen the installation "~.as n1ade the 
d i~1nrn~hrr "·n,s n l1o\Y<:'d to protrude t\YO inches beyond 
t.1u' rt~~t of the cabinet (T-3S). Further. it 'Yas shown 
that. dPspitt' respondents' pronrise to purchase and install 
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the dishwasher, they delayed payment for more than 
four months and appellants finally became embarrassed 
over the protracted refusal to pay and paid for it them-
selves (T-36-37). Aside from respondents' excuse that 
the di.shwasher happened to be the wrong size to fit 
properly, there was nowhere any evidence to show that 
they had made any attempt to make a proper installation. 
As further evidence of unsatisfactory workmanship 
and defective material, appellant Mrs. Levinson testi-
fied that the acoustical tile, which was .applied to the 
basement ceiling after the contract of sale, had started 
to fall off and that at the time of the trial it was off 
in many spots (T-41, 42); that there was a hole in one 
of the basement bedroom walls through which one could 
see into the furnace room ( T -42) ; that respondents had 
misfortune with the paint on one of the basement walls 
and, in their attempt to remedy it by blending it with 
another color, made things worse by producing a sort 
of patchwork design of two colors ( T-44) ; that respond-
ents promised that a lawn had already been planted but 
that nothing appeared but a vigorous patch of mustard 
weeds (T-45); that the doors of the house were all 
warped; particularly the bathroom door which was so 
mis-shapen that it wouldn't close, and that respondents 
promised that the doors "would all be taken care of" 
(T-46, 47) ; that the bath tub in the basement had an 
unsightly rust appearance which cannot be removed 
(T-47); that the drain in the basement will not function, 
despite efforts of plumbers which have been hj red by 
appellants, leaving the basement partly filled with water 
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from the air conditioner during the summer (T-48); 
that the dampers in the fire places were not installed or 
were improperly installed because snow and rain storms 
always fill the fireplace with water (T-49); that a cement 
wall surrounding the patio was cracked and had to be 
repaired and paid for by appellants (T-51); that re-
spondent.s promised to supply two forty-gallon water 
heaters, but that they totally failed to do so (T-82, 83); 
and that appellants had to clean paint stains from the 
chrome, tile and floor (T-88). 
The most serious single defect alleged by appellants 
\\Tas with regard to 'a concrete slab top to the garage. 
This structure was actually attached to the hou.se and 
\Vas designed to serve as a summer outdoor living patio 
on the upper surface, as ''ell as a roof for the garage. 
When appellants inspected the house prior to purchase, 
they were unable to detect any cracks in this structure 
( T -95). On the day they actually moved into the house, 
however, they noticed a substantial crack in the cement 
"·all \vhich surrounded the garage (T -95). Later on, 
"·hpn appellant ){rs. Levinson washed the patio, she 
firRt notie.ed that \\·ater leaked through the cement and 
into the ga.ragP (T-1:20). The leak "~as in the nature of 
a ra~t dripping all around the sides and in the center, 
and tl1P cars \\·ere drenched (T-45, 46). 
rpJH'rP \\•as C\"id~"\nee introduced at the trial to ShOW 
t.hnt it '"ould eo~t appella11ts a substantial sum to remedy 
the d(\ r('et~ InPntionPd. The necessary re-painting in the 
Jo\\'(\r pfevnt ion, according to an est:llna.te of a painter 
of eon~iderablc cxperienee, \\'"ould cost $694.00 (T-77). 
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Repair of the leaky garage roof and patio, according 
to a builder of long experience, would cost $1,287.50 plus 
tax (T-19). These items, plu.s the dishwasher and disposal 
units, and estimated costs ·on other items, caused appel-
lants to calculate their loss from respondents' breach 
of contract to be $4,000.00 (R-Answer & Counterclaim). 
On one occasion respondent Mr. Haymore arrived at 
appellants' house for the purpose of repairing some of 
the acoustical tile, and he was asked by appellant Mrs. 
Levinson whether he intended to repair or alter any 
of the other items (T-88). Mr. Haymore replied that he 
did not, and appellant Mrs. Levinson then said that she 
was disappointed with a great deal of the work and 
that it would not be complete satisfaction to have only 
the tile on the ceiling replaced ( T -88). Whereupon re-
spondent Haymore left the premises and never returned 
to finish any of the work. 
Upon the unwillingness of respondents to perform 
the work requested by appellants, and upon the un-
willingness of appellants to release to respondents the 
$3,000.00 in escrow until such work was performed, the 
respondents brought suit upon the contract to collect 
the $3,000.00. The trial court found that respondents 
had performed their obligations under the contract, with 
the exception of appliances and work amounting to 
$261.00, and thereupon entered judgment against appel-
lants in the sum of $2, 739.00. The court further found 
that there were no structural defe-cts in the house and 
that there were no express or implied ~?arranties a~ to 
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claim was completely disallowed. 
STATEMENT OF POINTS 
POINT I. 
THE COURT ERRED IN REFUSING TO GIVE EFFECT 
TO THE EXPRESS CONDITION THAT THE WORK MUST 
BE PERFORMED TO THE APPELLANTS' (PURCHASERS') 
SATISFACTION. 
POINT II. 
THE COURT ERRED IN REFUSING TO GIVE EFFECT 
TO THE EXPRESS ONE YEAR GUARANTEE AGAINST 
STRUCTURAL DEFECTS. 
POINT III. 
THE EVIDENCE DOES NOT SUPPORT THE JUDG-
MENT ENTERED BY THE TRIAL ·COURT. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I. 
THE COURT ERRED IN REFUSING TO GIVE EFFECT 
TO THE EXPRESS CONDITION THAT THE 'YORK l\I"UST 
BE PERFORMED TO THE APPELLANTS' (PURCHASERS') 
SATISFACTION. 
It is first necessary to revie"T the nature and essence 
of the contract in question. ....\.ppellants n1ade an offer 
to purehase on ,an approved forn1 of the l~tah State 
Securities Co1n1ni,ssion and the Salt Lake Real Estate 
Board. This for.1n \vas entitled HEarnest ~Ioney Receipt 
and Offer to Purehasen (Exhibit 1). _._\.ppellants offered 
to pay a total purchase p-rice of $36,000.00 for the house 
in question, but, since it \vasn ~t quite con1pleted, they 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
7 
included as part of their offer the provision that $3,000.00 
of this price would be placed in escrow and released 
only upon the .satisfactory completion of the work re-
maining (Exhibit 1). It was provided that this work must 
be performed within sixty days, but the offer. was later 
amended to allow ninety days. It is important to stress 
the fact that appellants insisted upon "·satisfactory com-
pletion" of the work, and in order to so provide they 
included that express provision as a condition precedent 
to payment. Otherwise, there would have been no con-
dition of personal satisfaction in the "form" contract. 
If respondents (vendor-builder) had not been vvilling 
to undertake to complete the house to the satisfaction 
of .appellants, they should have objected to that provision 
in the offer before they accepted it. 
The trial oourt, in ignoring this condition of satis-
factory completion, violated the most fundamental con-
cept of contract law: That a man ought to be required 
to do what he has promised to do. The elemental con-
tract law of offer and acceptance concerns itself with 
promises which people make to each other in the busine'Ss 
world. When one party offers to purchase under certain 
conditions or limitations, and the other party accepts 
that offer, the parties are held to the bargain that they 
have made. The fundamental concern is that if parties 
are not legally bound by their contracts, there could be 
no order or progress in the business world. Similarly, 
if one paDty :Us free to alter his promise after the1 (~ont1r1act 
is entered into, commercial confusion would result. 
It is not surprising, therefore, to find that the 
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authorities are in unanimou.s accord to the effect that 
a promise to perfonn to the satisf.action of the other 
party is enforceable. Excerpts from Corpus Juris Secun-
dum, Volume 17, c·ontracts, Sec. 495 are helpful. In 
explaining the general nature of this type of contract, 
it states: 
"Contracts in which one party agrees to per-
form to the satisfaction of the other are ordinarily 
divided into two classes: Where fancy, taste, 
sensibility, or judgment are involved; and where 
the question is merely one of operative fitness 
or mechaniCJal utility. • Satisfactory' in cases of the 
character under consideration means satisfactory 
to the promisor, if the contract is silent as to the 
person to whom the work, etc., shall be satisfact-
ory." (emphasis added) 
·When the contract is to perform to one's personal 
taste or judgment, the refusal to accept such performance 
is completely within the prerogative of the person to 
be satisfied. The party obligated to perform cannot com-
plain if the rejection is unreasonable : 
"In contract.s involving matters of fancy, 
taste, or judgment, \vhen one party agrees to 
perfor1n to the satisfaction of the other, he renders 
the other party the sole judge of his satisfaction, 
and this ordinarily \Yithout regard to the justice 
or reasonableness of his decision~ and a court 
or jury cannot .say that such party should ha\e 
been s.atisfied where he asserts that he is not.~' 
If, on the other hand, the contract to satisfy con-
cerns something of operative fitness or mechanical utility, 
the test might be somewhat different. It is clear that 
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the person to be satisfied still has the right to refuse 
the performance if his decision is a reasonable one. 
Further, there is considerable .authority to the effect 
that, if the refusal is in good faith, the court cannot 
inquire whether the rejection is unreasonable: 
"Where a contract involving operative fitness 
or mechanical utility clearly provides that per-
formance shall be s.ati.sfactory to the promisor, 
he is generally held to be the sole judge of his 
own satisfaction in the matter, if ... he acts in 
good faith." 
"It would seem that, where the subject matter 
of the contract involves a question ·of individual 
taste or sentiment rather than of utility, neither 
the good f.aith or genuineness, nor the rea;sonable-
ness, of the expressed dissatisfaction can be in-
quired into. There is, however, authority for the 
proposition that the dissatisfaction must be hon-
estly entertained even in such a case. 
"Where the subject matter of the contract 
relates to a thing which is ordinarily desirable only 
bec.ause of its commercial value or its mechanical 
fitness, it is held that the party must act in good 
faith and must be honestly dissatisfied." 
Moving to a specific consideration of contracts in-
volving building or construction contracts, the rule is 
that the building must satisfy the purchaser if the con-
tract so provides. In thi.s respect, the dissatisfaction 
of the purchaser must be in good faith and the mere 
fact that the refusal is unreasonable is not determinative 
of bad faith: 
"Where the contract merely requires the 
builder to perform the work according to certain 
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plans and specifications, it is not necessary, in 
case the work is so performed, that it also be 
performed to the satisfaction of the owner. Where, 
however, the contract so provides, the work must 
be performed to the owner's satisfaction, in the 
absence of a waiver or estopp-el. The dissatisfac-
tion of the owner must be in good faith. It has 
been held that bad faith is not conclusively shown 
even by unreasonable dissatisfaction, and that the 
promisee cannot recover where the promisor is 
not satisfied, even though he should be satisfied." 
( em:phasi's 'adderd) 
These principles quoted from Corpus Juris Secundum 
are completely affirmed in American Jurisprudence, 
Volume 12, Contracts §§ 340-41. The Restatement of 
Contracts, § 265, summarizes the same rules. The Utah 
law also is in firm accord with these principles. The lead-
ing case, Midgley v. Campbell Bldg. Co., 38 Utah 293, 112 
Pac. 820 (1911), \vi1l be discussed later. It seems un-
necessary at this point to set out additional authority 
purely £or thre purpose of <'Orrohorating principles of law 
about which there is no dispute. 
Far more helpful, and the best analy-sis of the law 
in this area, is the analysis found in Corbin on Contracts, 
One Volume Edition, §§ 645-48 (1952). In light of the 
excellence of Professor Corbin's analy-sis, and his exposi-
tion of the underlying reasons supporting these rules 
of law, a rather extensive excerpt s-ee1ns justified: 
"In spite of depressions, political changes~ 
and group pressures barked by force, \Ye still have 
freedom of contract in a high degree: and the 
contract that we have chosen to -Jnake -zvill usu,alh! 
be enforced by the courts as we have made it. 
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So, a contractor can, by the use of clear and ap-
propriate words, make his own duty expressly con-
ditional upon his own personal satisfaction with 
the quality of the performance for which he ha8 
bargained and in return for which his promise is 
given." (~em·plhasriJs 1added) 
* * * * 
"Consider and compare the following bilateral 
contracts: 
{ 
A promises to do certain work. 
B promises to pay $100. 
"In this case there are mutual promises that 
are mutually dependent, but nothing is said about 
anybody's satisfaction. If A does the work in ac-
cordance with specifications, he has fully dis-
charged his duty and B has no claim for damages 
even though he is not satisfied. Also, B is under 
a duty to p.ay the full amount promised even 
though he is not satisfied. B's personal satisfaction 
has not been promised by A, nor is it a condition 
precedent to B 's duty to pay. ( 1emphla~sis added) 
II. satisfaction of B. { 
A promises to do specified work to the personal 
B promises to pay $100. 
"In this case also we have mutual promises 
that are mutually dependent. The only difference 
between this and the first case supposed above 
is that now A has not only promised to do the 
work according to specifications; he has also 
promised to do it to the satisfaction of B. If 
he does not do the work to B's s.a tis faction, he 
has broken his promise; and B could maintain 
an action for damages, although these damages 
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would be only nominal, in case the work is proved 
to be in accordance with specifications. In this 
case B's duty to p.ay the contract price is not 
expre·ssly made conditional upon his O"\Vn satisfac-
tion. T:he fact tha.t A 1has expressly promised 
to satisfy B is not at all the same things as to make 
B's duty to pay expressly conditional upon his 
satisfaction. Nevertheless, if the character of the 
work that is promised by A is of such a kind that 
its excellence or accuracy is largely a matter of 
personal taste and feelings and cannot readily be 
determined by objective standards, performance 
of A's p·romise to the satisfaction of B will prob-
ably be held to be of the essence of the contract. 
If such is the case, B' s personal satisfaction will 
be held by construction of law to be a condition 
precedent to B's duty to pay, even though the 
terr~ts of the contract did not rnake it such a condi-
tion in express words. (emphasis added) 
A promises to do specified work. 
B promises to pay $100 if the work as done is 
satisfactory to him p·ersonally. 
"Here we have another valid bilateral con-
tract. A has promised to do the \York in accordance 
with specifications, but he has not pronrised to 
produce satisfaction in B. If the \York is done ac-
cording to specifications, _._\_ l1as con1pletely per-
formed his contractural duty, eYen though B is 
not satisfied 'vith the result: and B can n1aintain 
no action for damages against A. On the other 
hand, B has e~rpressly ·Jnade h£s duty to pay $100 
conditional upon his OU'n personal satisfaction_; 
and if he is in good fat~fh not satisfied he is -not 
bouu.d to pay the $100, even though, in the opinion 
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of other competent critics, A's work is exactly in 
accoTdance with specifications. A has not fulfilled 
a condition precedent to B's duty, although he 
has f~tlly performed his own duty as required 
by his express promise. This is applicable to build-
ing contracts and other kinds, as well as to those 
more definitely involving matters of personal taste 
and feeling; but in such cases we may find the 
court failing to observe the express condition, or 
else refusing to give it effect, in order to avoid 
an unjust result. c·ourts prefer to interpret even 
such words .as these as requiring only the satis-
facti·on of a reasonable man!'' (emphasis added) 
The contract in the case .at bar is clearly a bilateral 
contract falling within Corbin's Class III. Professor Cor-
bin then continues to analyze contracts involving personal 
taste and personal fancy and explains that the subjective 
judgn1ent of the person to be satisfied in conclusive. 
l-Ie s.ays that "it is enough for us to be sure that ac-
cording to standards of men in general [the purchaser] 
ought not to be compelled to pay without being personally 
satisfied." Finally, Professor Corbin considers the ques-
tion whether there should ever be a judicial disregard 
of express words of condition: 
"Where two parties have made a bilateral 
contr.act in which A promises to render a specified 
perfonnance and B promises to pay therefor on 
the express condition of his personal satisfaction 
with the performance rendered, should the courts 
ever enforce B's promise to pay in spite of his 
honest but unreasonable dissatisfaction? When A 
has convinced court and jury that he had per-
formed his promise according to specific.ations, it 
often seems harsh and unjust to deny judgment 
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for the promised compensation. In the absence 
of fraud or mistake, courts generally deny that 
they can or will ever set aside an express condi-
tion, even though it is the personal state of the 
mind of an interested party. But they often can 
and do produce the same result by indulging in 
a process of pseudo-interpretation, finding that 
the language used means the 'satisfaction of a 
reasonable man.' When this is in fact what is 
done, it is a substitution by the court of a reason-
able condition precedent in place of what seems 
to the court an unreasonable condition precedent. 
Such pseudo-interpretation as this, constitutes a 
judicial limitation upon the freedom of contract 
of the parties. It may perhaps be justifiable at 
times, because of inequality in the economic bar-
gaining power of the parties at the time they make 
the contract. Such inequality, however, has not yet 
consciously and openly been recognized by the 
courts as a reason for limiting freedom of con-
tract and for depriving the party in the superior 
economic position of some of the advantages that 
would be his by the express terms of the agree-
ment.'' ( emp.ha;sis added) 
The law is clear. The question, then, is one of fact 
In determining whether a house is a tiring of personal 
taste and enjoyment or merely a thing of mechanical 
utility. It is sub1nitted that a house should rank high 
among those aesthetic things "Thich are dependent upon 
personal satisfaction and taste, rather than things of 
mere op·erative fitness or mechanical utility. Appellants 
agreed to spend $36,000.00 to acquire a house that 'Yould 
be their ho1ne. There they "~ould live their lives, and 
there they would entertain their friends, relatiYes and 
social visitors. It 'vould be difficult to say that the finish-
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ing and decorating of a house does not contribute to 
one's personal fancy, taste, and judgment. Aside from 
the express promise to render .a "satisfactory comple-
tion," respondents agreed to allow appellants to select 
the colors for the finishing and the knobs for all of the 
closets and dra-vvers (Exhibit 2). Thus, it is clear that 
respondents knew that appellants had a vital personal 
interest in the quality and appearance of their home. 
The only Utah case of consequence in this area of 
the law, Midgley v. Campbell Building, Co., supra, offers 
some help. That case held that in a contract for the con-
struction of a public building a promise for "the faithful 
execution of the work to the full and complete satisfac-
tion of the supervising architect'' did not allow the 
architect's rejection to be unreasonable, arbitrary or 
capricious. The court held that when a contract specifies 
that Clow & Sons plumbing fixtures are to be installed 
and the building contractor installs Crane & Co. plumb-
ing fixtures of equal quality, it is unre~sona.ble for the 
supervising architect to reject the building solely on that 
ground. The Court could see little aesthetic value or 
artistic taste in public wash basins and urinals. Public 
urinals, however, are clearly distinguishable from the 
decoration and finishing of a private home, and the 
c·ourt so recognized: 
"The (defendant) has referred us to numer-
ous cases to the effect, and with which holdings 
we concur, that where a promisor agrees to pay 
for work or goods provided he is satisfied with 
them he cannot, if he is not satisfied, be made to 
accept and pay for them, or be compelled to pay 
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for them if he rejects them; and that the right, 
except for fraud or bad faith, to inquire into the 
ground for his action, is ordinarily excluded. In 
such case, when he has not accepted the goods or 
the benefit of the work, it generally is sufficient 
that he said he was "not satisfied." This principle, 
however, is more generally applied to cases in-
volving taste, fancy, sensibility, or judgment of 
the promisor * * * The principle, has also been 
applied by some of the courts to questions in-
volving not only fancy, taste, etc., but also to 
what is termed by them operative fitness or me-
chanical utility. References to the cases may be 
formd in 9 Cyc. 617-624. ( emphirusis ~dded) 
Appellants contracted for certain items to be furn-
ished and certain work to be performed in the completion 
of their home. It is clear that it was the taste and judg-
ment of the appellants (purchasers) which \\as to be 
satisfied. They were the ones who made the offer and 
who included that provision as a condition precedent. 
Even if it could be argued that it is uncertain "'\rho is 
to be satisfied, the la"'\v is unequivocal to the effect that 
in such a situation the purchaser is presumed to be 
the one who must be satisfied. Corpus Juris Secundunz, 
Volume 17, Contracts Sec. 495 (a); Willianzs r. Hirshorn, 
91 N. J. Law 419, 103 Atl. :23: Solonzou t. Ford,. 108 Pa. 
Super. 43, 164 Atl. 92; 13 Corpus Juris 675~ note 29. 
Until this 'vork satisfied a.ppellants' personal taste 
and judgn1ent, the sun1 of $3,000.00 held in esrro"'\Y vras 
not to be released. Under the very clear pronouncen1ent 
of .all of the authorities, appellants, refusal to accept 
the vvork could be unreasonable so long as it "'\Yas an 
honest dissatisfaetion. 1 f this Court disagrees, and holds 
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that a private home is not a thing of personal taste, but 
merely a thing of mechanical utility, then there is still 
considerable authority to the effect that the refusal can 
be unreasonable if it is in good faith. But, even if this 
Court should apply the strictest test which courts have 
applied to things of mechanical utility, that of reasonable-
ness, appellants must still prevail. The evidence at the 
trial indicated that appellants' refusal to accept was 
very re.asonable. Testimony as to respondents' careless 
work and faulty installation was given by appellant 
Mrs. Levinson ( T -36-52, 81-90), experienced builder Mr. 
Roberg (T-17-21), and experienced painter Mr. Keene 
(T-25-34). Thus, even under the test most favorable to 
respondents, appellants are justified in their reasonable 
dissatisf.action and consequent refusal to release the 
escrow money. 
This does not mean that respondents are without 
a remedy if they have rendered a substantial pe-rform-
ance which is benefitting appellants. If the contract is 
one for personal taste and judgment, the person obligated 
to perform is excused from further efforts .after making 
an honest attempt to perform, and only nominal damages 
will be charged against him. Corpus Juris Secundum, 
Volume 17, Contracts Sec. 495(b); Corbin on Contracts, 
Sec. 645. And if the contract is one for operative fitness 
or mechanical utility, the person obligated to perform 
may seek compens.ation measured by the actual benefit 
which the other party derives from such services. This 
remedy is similar to quantum meruit, restitution, or 
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unjust enrichment and is explained by Corbin in Section 
648. 
The error of the trial court was in refusing to give 
any consideration at all to the condition precedent of 
satisfaction of the purchasers, and in merely assuming 
that respondents had performed all of their obligations 
if their work could be considered average by some mem-
bers of the building industry. This seems to be using 
a test similar to the implied warranty of merchanta-
bility in the law of sales of p,ersonal property, (even a 
le,sser requirement than reasonable fitness for the pur;.. 
pose), and goes contrary to every basic principle of 
contract law which requires a party to answer for the 
express promises which he has made. The judgn1ent of 
the trial court should be reversed, and if respondents 
are entitled to any remedy at all, it should be for the 
reasonable v.alue of the work that they have performed 
as measured by the benefit to appellants and discounted 
by the fact that they failed to satisfy the condition 
precedent. Their remedy cannot be enforce1nent of pay-
ment under a contract \vhen they have failed to meet an 
express condition precedent to such payn1ent. 
POINT II. 
THE COURT ERRED IN REFUSING TO GIVE EFFECT 
TO THE EXPRESS O~E YEAR GUARANTEE AGAINST 
STRUCTURAL DEFECTS. 
As part of the eo .. 1tract of purchase~ appellants in-
sisted that they be givl•n a one year guarantee against 
structur.al defects in the house. This guaranty "~as in-
eluded on a supple1nental sheet "~hich "\vas n1ade a part 
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of the contract (Exhibit 2). The law of express war-
ranties is not in dispute. Everyone agrees that if a struct-
ural defect occurred within a year from the date of 
purchase, respondents are liable for the reasonable cost 
to repair the defect. The nature of a promise consti-
tuting a guaranty or warranty, and the appropriate 
remedy therefore, is outlined by Professor Corbin, op. 
cit. supra, § 14 as follows: 
"A promise may be expressed in the form 
of a warranty, and that which appears to be the 
object of desire and expectation on the part of 
the promisee may be something over which the 
promisor has absolutely no power or control. 
Thus, as a part of a contract that A is making 
with B, A may warr.ant rthat a horse is sound and 
free from vice, or that a steel rail is free from 
internal and invisible flaws, or that the ship 
"Peerless" arrived in Amsterdam day before 
yesterday. Warranties of this kind may turn out, 
on proper interpretation, not to be promises .at 
all, but to be mere representations of fact, the 
truth of which is a condition precedent of the 
other party. If proper interpretation, however, 
shows them to be promises, it is believed that 
what is being promised and what the promisee 
is being led to expect on the part of the promisor, 
is indemnification against loss, in case the facts 
turn out to be not as represented. It is not that 
the promisor will instantly make the vicious horse 
gentle, or the steel rail flawless, or cause the 
Peerless to have been in.,Amsterdam when she 
wa1s in the B1ay 1of Bi~scay. '' (emphasris 1added) 
It is readily seen that the case at bar is most closely 
analagous to the defective steel rail, and that respondents, 
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in effect, agreed to indemnify appellants against loss 
for any structural defects which occurred within one 
ye·ar from the date of the contract. 
The question, therefore, is purely one of fact, i.e., 
whether the substantial crack in the garage wall and 
the multiple leaks in the garage roof (patio) constituted 
a structural defect within the contemplation of the parties 
when they signed the contract. The contract of sale was 
entered into on November 7, 1955. The defect alleged 
by appellants was first noticed in May of 1956 (T-120), 
which was about six months later and well within the 
one ye,ar limitation. Hence, the time of the occurrence 
of the alleged defect presents no problem, and our atten-
tion focuses upon the gravity of the alleged defect. 
The evidence fairly tended to show that the crack 
in the garage wall was obviours, substantial, in need of 
immediwte rep·air, and was quite costly to repair (T-51) ; 
and that there were cracks in the roof of the garage 
(the patio) which allowed water to drip through the 
entire are.a and drench the cars (T-45). Some of the 
witnesses introduced by respondents testified that they 
had made a casual inspection of the garage but tl1at they 
hadn't noticed any signs of leaking. They testified that 
it was not too light in the garage, .and that they opened 
a door to enable them to see a little better. But they 
did not pour water on the roof to deternrine the nature 
and the extent of the leal\:, nor is there any"~here any 
evidence that a very diligent effort 'vas made by these 
witnesses to detern1ine the extent of the defect. 
Appellants, on the other l1and, felt it necessary to 
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have this condition repaired. They called Mr. Roberg, 
a builder with Elias Morris & Sons Co. for over twenty 
two years, and had him examine the roof to determine 
how it could best be repaired (T-18, 19). Mr. Roberg 
examined the roof and found evidence of serious leaking 
all around the edges and in the middle, thereby requiring 
a waterproof emulsion repair which it was estimated 
would cost $1,287.50 (T-18, 19). 
The question, therefore, is whether this condition 
of the garage roof (patio) constitutes a structural defect 
under the express one year guarantee (Exhibit 2). Re-
spondents called a couple of witnesses who testified that 
cement sometimes cracks, and that it isn't uncommon 
to find some leaks re~ulting from weather cracks in 
cement. It is submitted that this is insufficient to satisfy 
ijhe guaranty by p~r.oving there w:as ·no defect. 
Appellants were purchasing a new house. They ex-
pected everything in that house to be structurally sound 
and, in order to insure that they would be so protected, 
insisted upon the express guaranty. They had every 
reason to expect that the roof on the garage would keep 
out, rather than merely strain through, water. It is not 
enough for respondent to show that leaks sometimes 
occur in cement roofs. It would not even be enough if 
respondent could show that it was common for cement 
roofs to leak. We are dealing with a specific situation 
where there was an express guaranty against structur:al 
defects. There was evidence from .an expert that the 
workmanship was defective, that adequate care had not 
been taken in constructing the roof to insure against 
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leakage, and that in fact there was considerable evidence 
of leakage (T-18, 19). There was further testimony that 
this was not a minor leak, but was a rapid dripping 
over the entire surface of the roof (T-45). As a matter 
of common knowle~dge, new roofs in expensive houses 
do not leak in the absence of some defect. If there were 
no express guaranty, p·erhaps the rule of caveat emptore 
would ap·ply. But where there is an express guaranty, 
and a ·defect occurs within the prescribed period of the 
guaranty, it is elemental that the guarantor must resp-ond 
in damages. 
The error committed by the trial court was in as-
suming that there was no structural defect if it could 
be shown that cement is prone to crack. This was an 
erroneous test to apply to determine whether there was 
a structural defect. The true test to be applied is whether 
the parties, at the time they entered into the contract, 
would have considered these defects to constitute "struct-
ural defects" within the meaning of the guaranty. In 
other words, does it seem reasonable that appellant pur-
chasers would have ente~red into the contract if they 
would have. known that they would not be indemnified 
against such defects under the guaranty. In light of all 
of the facts and the surrounding eircun1stances, it is 
submit,ted that both parties fairly conte1nplated that ap-
pellant purchasers 'Yould be inden1nified .against such 
defects under the guaranty. The house "~as rather ex-
pensive ($36,000.00) and good quality ""'"orkinanship could 
be expected. The garage 'vas attached to and 'vas p.art 
of the house. Within six 1nonths fron1 the contract of 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
23 
sale, and well within the one year guaranty, theTe was 
a serious crack in the. surrounding wall of the; garage 
and serious leaks throughout the roof. Reasonable con-
struction of the roof and patio in the first instance could 
have prevented these defects (T-18, 19). It would indeed 
be a stretch of the imagination to say that an expensive 
home, while yet new, can have large cracks in the walls 
and serious leaks in the roof without being defe.ctive. To 
so hold is to strip the express guaranty of any effect 
whatsoever, and to deny the appellants one of the essen-
tial express provisions of their bargain. 
The counterclaim of the appellants should have· been 
allowed under the express terms of the contract, and 
the trial court erred in finding as a fact that there we-re 
no structural defects. 
POINT III. 
THE EVIDENCE DOES NOT SUPPORT THE JUDG-
MENT ENTERED BY THE TRIAL ~COURT. 
If there had been neither (1) an express condition 
of satisfaction of the purchasers, nor ( 2) an express 
one year guaranty against structural defects, the judg-
ment of the trial court might or might not be defensible. 
Indeed, the trial court seemed to arrive at its findings 
of fact and conclusions of law without respect to the 
express provisions m·entioned. 
No one disputed nor discounted these express pro-
visions. The evidence conclusively established the serious 
leak in the garage roof (patio) and the wall. Expert 
testimony said this could have been averted and that 
the work was defective. Even if the work wasn't defective, 
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extraneous forces caused a defect to appear within a 
year. No one questioned appellant Mrs. Levinson's sin-
cerity or good faith in her dissatisfaction with the work 
in her house. Even Mr. Keene, a painter of experience, 
testified that the finishing was not a good job and that 
the painting was careless (T-2·6-32). Respondent Mr. 
Haymore failed to show that reasonable work was p·er-
formed, and his testimony seems a general admission 
of substandard work (T-6-15). 
As already stated, ·One might challenge the judgment 
of the court even if the condition and the guaranty had 
not been in the contract. In light of the express condition 
and the express guaranty, however, the judgment of 
the trial court cannot stand under any view of the evi-
dence. 
CONCLUSION 
It is respectfully submitted that the trial court failed 
to honor the contract which appellants had made with 
respondents. The court erred in that (1) it failed to give 
effect to .an exp·ress condition of satisfaction of the 
appellant purchasers, and (2) it failed to give effect to 
an express one year guaranty against structural defects. 
This Court is respectfully urged to affirm the principle 
of freedom of contract by enforcing the reasonable 
promises made by each party. The judgn1ent should be 
reversed to provide that (1) appellants need not release 
the escrow 1noney until the condition precedent of its 
release is satisfied, and (:2) app·ellants be allowed the 
reasonable sum of $1,287.50 to repair the structural de-
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feet in the garage roof (patio), plus the reasonable cost 
of repair of the large crack in the garage wall, and 
costs on appeal. 
Respectfully submitted, 
CLYDE & MECHAM 
By Allan E. Me-cham 
Attorney for Appellant 
351 South State Street 
S.alt Lake City 11, Utah 
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